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Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Grading Incentives on 
Student Learning in Spain
         Joaquín Artés and Marta Rahona
In this article, the authors aim to identify the causal effect of the use of graded problem sets on
academic performance of Spanish students. The identification strategy relies on an experiment in
which the authors exploit variation arising from observing the performance of nearly 300 students
taking the same class during the same semester and with the same instructors. Academic performance
is measured through a multiple choice final exam in which some questions are related to graded
problem sets and others are related to non-graded problem sets given through the semester. After
accounting for potential biases and selection concerns, the results show that graded problem sets
increase test scores by eight percentage points, or close to a letter grade.
Keywords classroom experiment, homework, student performance
JEL codes A22, C93, I21
It has been shown in many articles that one of the most important determinants of students’
academic achievement is teacher quality (e.g., Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005). Very little is
known, however, about the specific characteristics or teaching techniques that make a teacher
better. This lack of knowledge makes education policies aimed at improving teacher quality likely
to fail. This article is focused on the effect of a specific teaching technique—the use of graded
problem sets—on academic achievement.
In studies dealing with the effect of teacher quality on academic performance, differences in
teacher quality are measured by comparing the results on standardized tests of different students
within the same school over years (e.g., Rockoff 2004; Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander 2007;
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005). They have found that there are significant differences in
teaching effectiveness even among teachers within the same schools. They also found, how-
ever, that differences among teachers’ effectiveness are not generally correlated with objective
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characteristics such as teachers’ education, age, salary, or experience (Hanushek 1986; Rivkin, 
Hanushek, and Kain 2005; Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2008; Carrell and West 2010). The inabil-
ity to identify a set of objective characteristics that good teachers share remains a challenge for 
researchers and policy makers.
In order to solve this challenge, in recent articles on academic achievement the focus has
moved from teachers’ characteristics to teaching methods. Based on theoretical models and
empirical articles that suggest that student effort is the single most important determinant of
student success (e.g., Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2008), identification of teaching methods
and techniques that create adequate incentives for students to put forth the effort needed to succeed
has been attempted in recent empirical articles on teaching effectiveness. For example, Figlio and
Lucas (2004) and Betts and Grogger (2003), using U.S. data, suggested that teachers with higher
grading standards improved the average academic performance of their students on standardized
tests (although the gains were not equally distributed across students). Similarly, Bonesrønning
(2004) evaluated different grading practices in a sample of Norwegian schools and also concluded
that hard graders obtain better results than easy graders. Oettinger (2002) studied the effect of
different grading schemes on academic performance and found that absolute grading schemes
(e.g., the A–F scale) and a continuous grading scheme do affect student effort differently, and
thus academic performance as well.
Another teaching method, the use of graded problem sets, is the subject of analysis in this
article. Graded problem sets have the potential to improve student learning because they create
a stronger incentive to work early on the material compared to non-graded problem sets, and
because they provide students with regular feedback (the grade) on their level of understanding.
The effectiveness of graded problem sets in improving student learning has been analyzed in
Grove and Wasserman (2006), Grodner and Rupp (2011), and Geide-Stevenson (2009). Grove
and Wasserman (2006) analyzed whether students performed better in college economic classes
when graded problem sets counted toward their grade. In order to identify the causal effect of
graded problem sets on academic achievement, they took advantage of a natural experiment that
allowed them to compare the performance of two similar groups of students who took the same
class under different grading requirements. They found that the group of students for which
problem sets did not count toward their grade did significantly worse on the same final exam
than the group of students for which problem sets were part of the grade. In particular, they
found a learning gain of one-third of a letter grade for the average student in the treatment
group.
Grodner and Rupp (2011) used a randomized experimental design and found that students in
the homework-required group performed half of a letter grade better on tests. Geide-Stevenson
(2009) used a methodology similar to Grove and Wasserman (2006), but applied it to a sample of
older and more experienced students and found no difference between students in the treatment
group and students in the control group, suggesting that more experienced students may not need
the regular feedback that graded problem sets provide in order to obtain a similar learning gain.
Several other articles have used survey data and non-experimental designs and also have found
a positive relation between homework assignment and test performance for samples of students
other than college level (e.g., Eren and Henderson 2008, 2011; Cooper, Robinson, and Patall
2006). Although this research has mainly focused on U.S. schools, in recent articles like Falch
and Rønning (2011) similar conclusions were reached using a sample of 16 OECD countries.
While this literature suffers from identification concerns compared to the use of experimental
designs, their results contribute to a body of evidence that indicates that at least part of the learning
gain that students obtain from teachers may come from objective teaching methods that can be
learned by instructors and applied in the classroom.
This article contributes to the above literature by providing the results from an experiment
carried out in college economic classes in Spain. To our knowledge, no article before has in-
vestigated the relationship between problem sets and academic achievement at the college level
in countries other than the United States. The choice of the country and the timing of the study
also are particularly relevant. During the last decade, Europe has undertaken a major reform of
its higher education system by implementing the European Space for Higher Education (ESHE).
While the most publicized goals of the reform are to improve the quality of European universities
and to gain convergence and mobility across them, a practical consequence of the reform, in the
case of Spain, has been to transform a lecture-based instruction system with little emphasis on
active learning into a system more similar to the United States in which labs, sections, applied
learning, and thus problem sets are heavily emphasized. Given the magnitude of this reform, the
scarcity of empirical studies quantifying the potential learning gains from the teaching methods
favored by the ESHE is surprising.
Our method of estimation is close to the experimental designs used in Grove and Wasserman
(2006), Grodner and Rupp (2011), and Geide-Stevenson (2009). In our study, the estimation
strategy also relies on a carefully designed experiment. We exploit variation arising from observing
the performance of nearly 300 students taking the same class during the same semester and
with the same instructors. A major advantage, however, is that due to the design of the experiment,
the identification of the causal effect comes from within-student variation. The students in the
control group are exactly the same ones as in the treatment group, which eliminates most selection
concerns. In particular, academic performance is measured through a long multiple choice final
test in which some questions are related to graded problem sets and others are related to non-
graded problem sets given throughout the semester. In addition, the identification strategy is
further refined by the fact that the problem sets that are required for credit are different in each
section, which allows us to control for differences in the difficulty of the exam questions. After
controlling for potential remaining biases and selection concerns, our results show that graded
problem sets increase test scores by 8 percentage points, or close to a letter grade. We also found
that the result is particularly strong among weaker students.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We describe the research design and data
in the next section and explain the econometric methods in the subsequent section. The next two
sections are devoted to the results, followed by the concluding section.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
The study was conducted at Complutense University of Madrid, Spain, during the fall of 2009.
Complutense University is the largest public university in Spain. Approximately 80,000 students
were enrolled during the academic year 2009–10.
In order to adjust to the needs of the ESHE, Complutense University undertook a major reform
of its academic offering during 2009 and 2010. New curricula were developed in all areas of
study. The new curricula were officially launched in the fall of 2010.1 The reform was supposed to
transform a system based on large classrooms, in which lectures were the main teaching method,
into another system in which smaller classes would be the norm. The new curricula significantly
reduced the amount of professors’ lectures and drastically increased the number of hours of
instruction through sections, labs, and applied work. Prior to the reform, grades were mostly
determined by the results obtained by students in only one final exam a year (to be taken in June
or September). On the other hand, instructors under the new system can use many more methods
of evaluation due to the reduction of class size and the increase in the number of lab or section
hours. As a consequence, the use of graded problem sets has increased significantly since the
implementation of the ESHE.
During the years prior to the launching of the reform, the European Union gave funding
to some universities to conduct research studies measuring the potential impact of the changes
favored by the ESHE. Complutense University received some of these funds and organized several
competitive calls to distribute the funding. We describe the results of a research experiment that
was awarded funding in 2009 in this article.
The classes in which the experiment was carried out took place at the Law School during
the year prior to the introduction of the new curriculum. The Law School at Complutense offers
both undergraduate and graduate degrees. This study was focused on the undergraduate degree.
Unlike the higher education systems of other countries (e.g., the United States), the curriculum
of undergraduate studies at Complutense in 2009 offered little flexibility to students in choosing
their courses. In order to obtain the degree, all the students had to take exactly the same 25 yearly
courses. Both having yearly courses instead of semesters and having a fixed curriculum were
common across many universities and undergraduate degrees prior to the development of the
ESHE. The law curriculum at Complutense was designed in 1953, and it is known as “Plan 53.”
At the time of this study, the plan had been in place for 56 years.
Economics courses comprise 2 out of the 25 courses of “Plan 53.” The first of these classes
is Principles of Economics. Students take this class during the second year of their five-year
program. The course is equivalent to a semester of principles of microeconomics and a semester
of principles of macroeconomics at American universities. The level of instruction is similar to
that of Mankiw’s (2011) Principles of Economics textbook. Mankiw’s book is indeed widely
used among instructors teaching this class.
The second economics course that students are required to take is “Public Finance.” Students
enroll in this class during their third year of studies. The class is a typical public economics course
divided into the equivalent of a semester of public expenditure and a semester of taxation. The
class is taught at the level of Rosen’s (2004) Public Finance book, which is also a widely used
text among instructors teaching this class.
The research experiment described in this article was conducted during the public expenditure
part of the Public Finance course offered in 2009. The total number of students who enrolled and
completed the class was 316. The class was offered at five different times, three days a week.
Three times were offered in the morning (from 8:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.) and two in the afternoon
(from 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m.). Two professors taught the five classes. One of the professors was
in charge of the morning classes while the other was responsible for the afternoon classes. At
the time of signing up for the class, students chose whether they wanted to take the class in
the morning or in the afternoon, but they could not decide in which specific group. The group
was assigned to the student by the university, and students could not change this assignment.
The assignment is alphabetical. This means that students whose last names start with the same
letter are allocated to the same class. We can consider this allocation as random, as there is
no evidence of any correlation between last name initials and academic performance. However,
the distribution of students between morning and afternoon classes is not random because it
depends on students’ choices. This is a concern for estimation purposes if students with different
ability or effort levels self-select disproportionately into either morning or afternoon groups. The
summary statistics of table 1 show that this might be the case because afternoon students are,
on average, older, obtained lower grades on the university entrance exam, and are more likely to
work part-time.2
The total number of students for which we were able to obtain data on all the relevant variables
used in the analysis was 289. The distribution of students among the different groups was 67, 69,
and 55 in the three morning classes and 60 and 38 in the afternoon classes.
On the first day of class, instructors gave students the syllabus and explained the grading system
and the organization of the class. Both instructors followed the same textbook and grading system.
The course grade was determined by the grade obtained on the final exam (90 percent) and the
graded problem sets (10 percent). Four problem sets were distributed throughout the semester.
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics: Mean (Standard Deviation)
All Students Morning Afternoon
Morning
Group 1
Morning
Group 2
Morning
Group 3
Afternoon
Group 4
Afternoon
Group 5
Overall grade 58.76 62.70 49.94 65.48 63.72 57.67 51.78 48.88
(21.06) (21.02) (18.21) (19.24) (21.70) (21.84) (17.22) (18.95)
Entrance exam 6.32 6.43 6.08 6.39 6.52 6.34 6.07 6.08
(1.01) (1.04) (0.88) (1.02) (1.01) (1.11) (0.94) (0.86)
Times enrolled 1.81 1.56 2.37 1.50 1.47 1.76 2.65 2.21
(1.32) (1.02) (1.69) (0.87) (0.77) (1.41) (1.84) (1.60)
Year entrance exam 2005.40 2005.92 2004.15 2006.68 2006.01 2005.62 2003.90 2004.30
(2.72) (2.15) (3.40) (1.43) (1.89) (3.05) (3.44) (3.43)
Collective decision
making
48.75 55.55 33.31 57.57 57.24 50.77 30.75 34.77
(29.68) (28.30) (26.94) (25.97) (28.52) (30.63) (28.25) (26.30)
Public goods 68.07 69.13 65.66 72.66 70.13 63.65 66.56 65.14
(30.27) (30.13) (30.61) (28.40) (28.51) (33.84) (28.93) (31.78)
Externalities 67.09 68.15 64.69 70.40 69.32 63.75 70.37 61.44
(29.05) (29.20) (28.73) (29.19) (28.27) (30.47) (27.77) (29.01)
Monopolies 54.36 60.17 41.87 64.28 61.27 53.56 49.74 37.37
(33.76) (31.97) (34.46) (31.00) (29.36) (35.82) (32.12) (35.21)
Treated questions 60.01 57.86 65.17 60.95 59.25 57.86 68.46 63.29
(30.22) (30.25) (29.61) (28.70) (28.92) (33.21) (28.20) (30.35)
Control questions 59.18 65.87 37.59 71.53 69.72 63.56 40.24 36.07
(33.30) (29.64) (31.13) (28.71) (28.30) (32.05) (31.49) (30.97)
Gender (% of females) 57.05 61.92 47.73 62.85 53.33 69.64 53.12 44.64
(49.52) (48.77) (50.01) (48.66) (50.22) (46.39) (50.70) (50.16)
Number of
observations
289 191 98 67 69 55 38 60
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The numbers in bold mean that the block corresponds to the treated
questions. Collective decision making and Monopolies are Treated questions for morning students and Control questions
for afternoon students. Public goods and Externalities are Control questions for morning students and Treated questions
for afternoon students.
Each of them referred to one of the four main blocks in which the course was structured. The
first problem set referred to collective decision-making and voting rules, the second one referred
to public goods, the third one dealt with externalities, and the fourth one with monopolies and
regulation. In each class, only two of the problem sets had to be turned in and were used to
compute the corresponding 10 percent of the final grade. The other two problem sets did not have
to be turned in. The four problem sets were exactly the same for all students, but the ones that had
to be turned in and graded were different in the morning and in the afternoon classes. The specific
problem sets that would count for a grade in the morning and afternoon groups were randomly
decided by instructors at the beginning of the experiment. Instructors heavily emphasized that the
four problem sets were equally important for the final exam regardless of whether they would be
graded or not. To make this point clearer, they made final exams from previous years available to
students.
The final exam consisted of 40 multiple choice questions divided into five blocks of approx-
imately equal numbers of questions. The first block of questions was a “theory block.” In this
block, students had to show knowledge of definitions and concepts explained during the class, but
not directly related to the material covered in the problem sets. Each of the other four blocks of
multiple choice questions was directly related to one of the four problem sets. All the 289 students
took the same final exam in the same classroom during finals week. For grading purposes, each
correct answer was given one point, incorrect answers were penalized with −0.333 point, and
blank answers did not add or subtract points. The grading scheme was clearly explained in the
first page of the exam and also by the instructors during the exam.
ECONOMETRIC ISSUES
The class organization and experimental set up just described is similar to that of Grove and
Wasserman (2006). An important difference, however, is that in our study each of the students
in the class is, at the same time, part of both the treatment and the control group, while in Grove
and Wasserman each student belonged to either the control or the treatment group. In their study,
the identification of the causal effect of having graded problem sets came from comparing two
very similar groups of students and observing the differences in performance in the treated group
versus the control group. In our case, we were able to observe the performance of the same student
under the treatment (questions for which problem sets were required) and without the treatment
(questions for which problem sets were not required). Identification arises from comparing the
performance of the same student on the questions subject to the treatment and the questions for
which the student did not receive the treatment. While comparing the performance of the same
student with and without the treatment is close to an ideal situation for the purposes of causal
identification, several potential threats must be addressed before we could be certain that we were
capturing a causal effect.
The most important concern was related to the difficulty of each of the problem sets. Ideally,
the perfect experimental design would consist of comparing the performance of the same student
on exactly the same questions on the exam, both with and without the treatment. This cannot be
done, because for any given student, a problem set cannot be both required and not required at the
same time. The problem then is that some problem sets are harder than others. If this is the case,
just comparing the performance of students on the questions related to graded and non-graded
problem sets would not capture the causal effect of requiring and grading problem sets. A higher
average score on the graded problem set questions could possibly mean that those questions were
simply easier than the questions on the test that referred to non-graded problem sets. Similarly, a
lower average score on the treatment questions could just imply that those questions were harder.
Our experimental design allowed us to take this into account because the required problem sets
were different in each of the classes. This means that each specific question on the exam was
answered both by students for which the corresponding problem set was required and graded
and students for which it was not. In addition, it is worth noting that the write-up of the problem
sets and the decision on which problem sets each group would have to turn in was made at
the beginning of the term prior to observing student characteristics in each group, so that the
assignment of each group into the treatment was uncorrelated with student characteristics.
A second concern was that morning and afternoon classes were taught by different instructors.
We knew from previous research that unobserved teacher characteristics have an impact on
academic performance of students (e.g., Rockoff 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005). If the
two instructors who participated in the experiment possess different unobservable characteristics
that affect the performance of the students on the questions related to graded problem sets, it is
possible that students taking the class with one of the instructors might perform better on some
blocks of the exam for reasons other than just the assignment of the problem set. For example, if
one of the instructors is particularly good at explaining public goods and this part of the material
is not included in one of the required problem sets in this class, finding no difference between
the performance of the students in this block compared to the graded problem sets blocks of the
exam might just mean that the teacher effect is counterbalancing the problem set effect.
A third concern was potential peer effects. Students took the class during the same semester
and with the same instructor but at different times and with different peers. In addition, student
composition in the morning classes and in the afternoon classes differed, with a higher rate of
part-time students and students with lower entrance exam grades in the afternoon class. Previous
literature suggests that working part-time is likely to have a detrimental effect on the academic
success of students (e.g., Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003). It is conceivable, therefore, that
requiring and grading problem sets may have differential effects on student performance due to
the different group dynamics. If students in one group are very cooperative, these students may
be performing better on certain parts of the exam just because they benefited from their peers’
help throughout the term. That is, two otherwise identical students taking the same course with
the same instructor and with the same requirements, but with different peers, could potentially
perform differently. Additionally, it is also possible that the group dynamics in some of the groups
are better, favoring also the performance of the instructor during the lectures in the better groups.
As group dynamics and instructor performance are likely to change during the term and thus
during the presentation of different parts of the course, a better performance on the problem-
set-required parts of the exam may be then explained, at least in part, by these peer and time
effects.
The concerns just outlined prevented us from being able to use a simple mean comparison to
identify the effect of interest. Each of these concerns, however, could be addressed econometrically
in a regression framework by controlling for the relative difficulty of each problem set, and for
teacher and group effects. In order to do so, we first rearranged the data into student/block
observations so that for each student we had four data points, one referring to each of the four
blocks of the exam. We then estimated a student fixed effects-model of the form:
Pointsij = b0 + b1Treatmentij + b2 Blockj + xi + eij, (1)
where Points is the number of points (as a percentage) obtained by student i in block j of the exam;
Treatment is a dummy that takes value 1 if the block refers to a graded problem set; Block is a set of
four problem set dummies that capture invariant differences among each block of exam questions,
such as their inherent difficulty; and xi is the set of student fixed-effects dummies that controls
for student invariant characteristics. Note that teacher and group are invariant within student, so
the student fixed-effects dummies control for these factors as well as for other student invariant
characteristics such as their relative ability level. In this model, therefore, we are exploiting the
variation that arises from observing the same student answering different blocks of questions,
holding the difficulty level constant across blocks.
A potential problem with the model of equation 1 is that the fixed-effects specification does
not control for the fact that students chose whether to be in the morning or afternoon classes.
If the reasons that led students to choose either morning or afternoon are correlated with how
they perform in the class and how the treatment impacts them, the estimates of equation 1
could be biased. As mentioned before, this was a concern because the summary statistics of our
sample showed that students in the morning classes were younger, less likely to work part-time,
and did better on both the entrance exam and in the class (see table 1). An alternative to the
model in equation 1 that solves this problem is to estimate a regression without fixed effects
but controlling specifically for teacher effects, group effects, student effort and ability level, and
other demographic characteristics such as gender or age. In this case, the corresponding regression
would be:
Pointsij = b0 +b1 Treatment + b2 Blockj + b3 Teacheri +b4 Groupi + b5 EntranceExami
+ b6TimesEnrolled + b7YearEntranceExami + b5 Female + eij, (2)
where, Points, Treatment, and Block are defined as in equation 1; Teacher is a dummy that
takes the value 1 for classes taught by one of the instructors and 0 otherwise; Group is a set
of dummy variables corresponding to each of the five groups of students; EntranceExam is the
grade obtained by the student in the nationwide general admission test that students have to take
prior to be admitted into college (called selectividad); TimesEnrolled is the number of times
that the students have pre-registered for the class before actually taking it, and is a proxy for
some student unobserved characteristics such as effort or part-time work;3 YearEntranceExam
is the year in which the student took the entrance exam and controls for age; and Female
takes value 1 for female students and 0 otherwise. This specification does not control for all
unobserved within-student characteristics, as the fixed-effects specification does. It is, therefore,
more likely to suffer from an omitted variable bias. This problem is alleviated by the inclusion
of EntranceExam, TimesEnrolled, YearEntranceExam, and Female. Provided that the omitted
variable bias is small, the specification in equation 2 allowed us to identify teacher and peer
effects separately as well as to quantify the effect of some observable student characteristics that
would otherwise be subsumed into the fixed effects term. In addition, as explained before, the
specification in equation 2 allowed us to explicitly control for systematic differences in ability
between morning and afternoon students that are not captured by the fixed-effects regression and
avoided, therefore, the problem of weaker or stronger students selecting themselves into either
morning or afternoon classes due to reasons not captured by the fixed-effects term. In the results
section below, we discuss the estimates of both equations 1 and 2.
The coefficient of interest in both equations is b1, which measures the differential effect
of requiring and grading problem sets on student performance. Positive and significant estimates
of b1 would support the claim that requiring and grading problem sets leads to an improvement
of student performance. The key identifying assumption of the model is that b1 would have been
zero if none of the problem sets had been required and counted towards the grade, or if all of
them had been required. If this is the case, then an unbiased estimate of b1 would be capturing
the causal effect of requiring problem sets.
Looking at within-student variation holding difficulty levels constant excludes some of the
validity threats that would question our key identifying assumption. A remaining selection concern
might be, however, that students prepare more for the parts of the exam that are related to graded
problem sets, not because having to turn in the problem sets and receiving feedback through
grades help them understand the material better, but because requiring problem sets sends a
signal that those parts of the material are more important for the exam. This kind of strategic
reasoning would lead to some students prioritizing the “treatment” part of the material for reasons
other than the treatment itself. This selection concern is likely to be small or inexistent due to three
facts. First, instructors emphasized several times during the term that the exam would consist of
an even number of questions from each problem set. Secondly, students had access to exams from
previous years, so they could verify that all four problem sets were equally weighted on the exam.
Third, even if students thought that requiring a problem set might be correlated with the content
of the exam, it is not clear what the sign of the correlation would be. Some students may think
that requiring the problem set signals that the material is more likely to be on the exam, but some
other students may think that, as they have already been tested on those parts of the course, the
exam would not emphasize them. For all these reasons, we believe that our identification strategy
is free from this kind of selection concern.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the relevant variables used in the analysis. The average
overall grade in the class for the students is 58.76 points out of 100. The result may seem low
for people not accustomed to the Spanish higher education system. Most Spanish universities,
and Complutense in particular, are large public universities where admission requirements are
relatively low even in prestigious schools. This means that in the same class there are very
strong students and relatively weak students. This is different from, for example, most American
universities in which strict admission procedures result in the student bodies of each university
being much more homogeneous. For example, “weak” students at Harvard University are still
strong students, while at Complutense, Harvard-type students coexist in the same classroom with
second-tier students. This heterogeneity also implies a big dispersion in grades and relatively
higher failing rates in each class. An average grade of 58 points is in line with historical rates of
success in the department and can be considered as normal.
Turning to the difference between morning and afternoon students, table 1 shows that morning
students perform, on average, better than afternoon students. This can be observed by looking at
the overall performance variable (e.g., the mean of the Overall Grade variable is 62.7 for morning
students and 49.94 for afternoon students). If we look at the average performance of each of the
five groups of students, the differences still exist. Every morning group performs better than
the best of the afternoon groups. Morning students are also stronger on average according to
the EntranceExam grade. They are also younger (e.g., took the entrance exam more recently),
and have pre-registered fewer times for the class before completing it. These differences are
consistent with the fact that a higher rate of part-time students enroll in the afternoon classes
and with the results of Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003), who argued that working part-
time had net detrimental effects on academic performance. Teacher and peer effects could also
explain, at least partially, some of the differences in performance in the class. The fact that the
student composition and performance differs in morning and afternoon classes supports the use
of controls and within-student variation to avoid selection concerns.
The summary statistics of table 1 also indicate that there seem to be important differences in the
difficulty across the different blocks of questions. Both morning and afternoon students in all five
groups performed significantly better on the questions related to public goods and externalities
compared to the other two blocks of problem-set questions. This is true regardless of whether the
block was treated or not. The summary statistics, however, anticipate that requiring and grading
the problem sets may have an impact on students’ learning. The difference in student performance
between the two relatively easier blocks of questions and the two harder ones is as high as 27.58
percentage points for the groups in which public goods and externalities were treated but is only
8 percentage points for the groups in which these two blocks were not treated (the numbers are
obtained by subtracting the rows labeled Treated questions and Control questions in table 1).
Overall, the summary statistics show that student ability, teacher, peer, and question difficulty
effects are likely present. For this reason, a simple mean comparison between the performance
of students on the treatment and on the control questions is not meaningful for the purposes of
identification.
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of two sets of models which control for student
ability, difficulty level, teacher, and peer effects. The first column corresponds to the fixed-effect
model described above in equation 1. The dependent variable in this model is the grade obtained
by the student in each block of questions.4 Among the covariates, the fixed-effects term controls
for student-specific variation such as student ability, teacher and peer effects, and the exam block
dummies control for the difficulty of the problem set. The variable of interest is Treatment.
The estimate of the coefficient of this variable is 0.084 and is significant at the 1-percent level.
According to this coefficient, requiring and grading problem sets has a positive impact on student
performance on the final exam of approximately 8.4 percentage points, or almost a letter grade,
caeteris paribus.
The ordinary least squares specifications of columns 2 to 5 in table 2 confirm the same result.
Column 2 shows the estimates of the model without any control variables except for the treatment
variable. Columns 3 to 5 add different control variables. These specifications show that once we
controlled for the difficulty level of each of the blocks of questions, the coefficient of the treatment
variable was very stable and was always significant at the 1-percent level. The magnitude of the
coefficient in these regressions is identical to the one in the fixed effect (FE) specification of
column 1. Thus, the causal effect of requiring and grading problem sets seems to be slightly less
than a full letter grade.
According to the results in table 2, student ability and effort level, as measured by En-
tranceExam, is an important determinant of student achievement. The R-square of the regression
TABLE 2
Determinants of Exam Block Grade as a percentage
1 2 3 4 5
FE OLS OLS OLS OLS
Treatment 0.084∗∗∗ 0.009 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Public goods 0.225∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Externalities 0.215∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Monopolies 0.057∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Entrance exam 0.081∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
Year entrance exam −0.005
(0.005)
Times enrolled −0.066∗∗∗
(0.025)
Female −0.004
(0.024)
Teacher 0.135∗∗∗
(0.036)
Group 1 −0.029
(0.030)
Group 2 −0.079∗∗
(0.036)
Group 5 0.054
(0.042)
Constant 0.430∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ −0.081 9.824
(0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.068) (9.581)
Observations 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156
R-squared 0.150 0.000 0.080 0.150 0.180
Note: Clustered (by student) standard errors in parentheses.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
increases from 0.08 to 0.15 when this variable is included. The coefficient of this variable is
significant at the 1-percent level in all the specifications, and has a value of 0.07 in the most
inclusive of them (last column of table 2). A 10-percent increase in performance on the entrance
exam is associated with an average increase of 7 percent on the performance in each block of
the exam. Other variables related with student ability and effort such as TimesEnrolled and Year-
EntranceExam behave as expected, although only TimesEnrolled is significant. According to the
coefficient of TimesEnrolled, students who signed up for the class in previous years but dropped it
early in the term perform worse in the class compared to students who have never before dropped
the class.
Unobserved teacher effects are also present. Column 5 shows that the teacher effects variable
is sizable and significant, although a word of caution is needed when interpreting this coefficient.
While differences in student ability and effort level in morning and afternoon classes are captured
by the EntranceExam, YearEntranceExam, and TimesEnrolled variables, the coefficient of the
Teacher variable may be capturing, in part, some unobserved student characteristics inadequately
controlled for by the variables that measure student ability.
The group dummies, on the other hand, are not significant except for one group. This is
consistent with the idea that the assignment of students to group by the university is random.
The gender dummy of column 5 is not significant either, pointing to no differences in class per-
formance related to gender differences. The literature on gender differences in student learning
suggests that men usually outperform women in economic classes and that this difference in
learning develops mainly during adolescence (Siegfried 1979; Heath 1989). We found no such
differences in our sample. This result may not be representative of potential learning differences
among the whole population of students if students selected into the Law School share a sim-
ilar set of analytical abilities that are different from those of the whole population of students
(Heath 1989).
EXTENSIONS
Previous literature suggests that students with different academic aptitudes may benefit differently
from graded assignments. According to this reasoning, better students would be less affected by
problem sets because they need fewer incentives to study during the term and less feedback from
instructors to do well in the class. On the other hand, the continuous effort that problem sets
require and the feedback provided by grading would benefit weaker students more by creating
an incentive to work continuously throughout the term. Grove and Wasserman (2006) found
no evidence of such a differential effect. They reached this conclusion by estimating a model
in which the treatment variable was interacted with student GPA. This coefficient is small and
non-significant in their study, which led them to conclude that there were no differential effects
across students. Such differences may exist, however, in a group of more heterogeneous students
such as the ones at Complutense. In addition, it is also possible that the effects across different
groups of students are nonlinear, in which case simply adding an interaction would not fully
capture differences across groups of students.
In the first column of table 3, we show the estimates of the same models as in table 2, but
add an interaction term. We use performance on the entrance exam as a proxy for student ability.
Contrary to Grove and Wasserman (2006), this term is significant and relevant in magnitude,
showing evidence of a differential effect of the treatment across student ability. The interaction
term is negative and has a value of –0.042. This means that better students (students who obtained
a higher grade on the entrance exam) benefit less from having graded problem sets compared
to weaker students. For a student who barely passed the entrance exam (e.g., 5 out of 10 in the
entrance exam), the effect of the treatment is 13 percentage points, or more than a full letter
grade.
To account for the possibility of nonlinear effects, columns 3 to 8 in table 3 show the estimates
of the FE and OLS models when the regressions are run separately for three different sub-
samples of students. Students in the first sub-sample are those with lower academic ability (those
that score in the lower 33rd percentile on the entrance exam). The second sub-sample includes
students between the 33rd and 66th percentile, and the third includes only the top-performing
TABLE 3
Determinants of Exam Block Grade as a Percentage, by Student Ability
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OLS FE FE FE OLS OLS OLS
All Lower Medium Top Lower Medium Top
Treatment 0.346∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.060∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.081) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
Public goods 0.219∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038)
Externalities 0.209∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036)
Monopolies 0.058∗∗ 0.041 0.020 0.111∗∗∗ 0.041 0.022 0.111∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.038) (0.045) (0.040) (0.038) (0.046) (0.041)
Entrance exam 0.091∗∗∗ 0.127 0.017 0.049∗∗
(0.013) (0.108) (0.090) (0.023)
Year entrance exam −0.005 −0.011 −0.002 0.011
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Times enrolled −0.066∗∗∗ −0.046 −0.048 −0.100∗∗
(0.025) (0.045) (0.059) (0.0451)
Female −0.004 −0.002 0.020 −0.035
(0.024) (0.042) (0.048) (0.032)
Teacher 0.135∗∗∗ 0.002 0.105 0.104∗∗
(0.036) (0.060) (0.088) (0.047)
Group 1 −0.029 −0.002 −0.046 −0.031
(0.030) (0.057) (0.062) (0.037)
Group 2 −0.019∗∗ −0.008 −0.088 −0.121∗∗
(0.036) (0.058) (0.075) (0.054)
Group 5 0.054 −0.106 −0.014 −0.021
(0.042) (0.066) (0.079) (0.060)
Treatment∗Entrance exam −0.042∗∗∗
(0.012)
Constant 9.694 0.327∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 22.179 3.675 −22.574
(9.587) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) (15.692) (13.041) (14.152)
Observations 1156 384 383 388 384 383 388
R-squared 0.190 0.180 0.080 0.270 0.140 0.080 0.280
Note: Clustered (by student), standard errors in parentheses.
∗significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
students. The coefficient of the Treatment variable in these three regressions indicates that top
students benefited comparatively less from the assignment and grading of problem sets. Both FE
and OLS models yield similar results. Top and middle students increased their performances by
approximately half a letter grade due to the treatment, while students in the bottom range of the
distribution increased their performance by more than a full letter grade. Overall, the results of
table 3 suggest the presence of a significant differential effect of grading problem sets on student
performance, with weaker students benefiting more.
CONCLUSION
The goal of many education policies is to improve students’ academic achievement. Educational
research has shown that students’ achievement improves with good teachers. Few policy impli-
cations have been derived from this fact, however, because it is difficult to identify, a priori, what
characteristics make one teacher better than others.
In this article, we have estimated the degree to which requiring and grading problem sets may
lead to an improvement of student performance. Our results show that the use of this technique
increases student performance in our sample by close to a letter grade. We also found that this
improvement is not equally distributed across students. Weaker students benefit relatively more
compared to better students.
The main policy implication of the results is that the use of graded problem sets appears to
be a powerful technique to increase students’ learning. As the ESHE promotes and facilitates
the use of frequent graded assignments as a pedagogical technique, large learning gains should
be expected, caeteris paribus. Our results also suggest that some objective characteristics of the
teaching style can indeed be identified as having potential to improve teaching performance.
To the extent that we can train instructors in the use of these techniques, we could achieve a
substantial improvement in student learning outcomes.
In this article, the effect of the use of graded problem sets on student performance has been
identified using data from an experiment. The main advantage of such a design is that it allows
attributing the improvement in test scores specifically to the use of problem sets and not to other
potential confounding factors. Nevertheless, as with other experimental designs, the results of this
analysis have limited generalizability because they refer to a specific economics course during a
specific semester in a specific university and country. The quantitative and qualitative importance
of the implications that can be derived from the results of this study can motivate further research
in this field so that the results can be better generalized. A natural extension of this research
would be to perform a similar analysis using data from different universities, countries, and fields
of study.
NOTES
1. Many other Spanish universities offered new programs during the fall of 2010, as that was the deadline
suggested by the Spanish government for all universities to adjust their academic offerings to the
ESHE.
2. We were not able to obtain exact data on the number of part-time students. The University Registrar,
however, did provide us with information regarding the number of times that a student had been pre-
enrolled in the class. This variable is measured as the number of times that students signed up for the
class without actually taking it. Some students drop the class during the semester without taking any of
the exams. It is reasonable to expect that part-time students or students with time constraints are more
likely to drop some their classes if they realize that they do not have enough time to complete all the
requirements.
3. See note 4 for a more detailed description of this variable.
4. To study the robustness of the model to the use of a different dependent variable, we also estimated the
different regressions using as the dependent variable the percentage of correct questions in each block,
which does not penalize incorrect questions. The results are both qualitatively and quantitatively the
same. These results are available upon request from the authors.
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